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Abstract 
Switzerland (7.2 million inhabitants) is a federal state composed of 26 cantons. Article 3 
of the Federal Constitution grants ample autonomy to individual cantons in those 
sectors that are not directly regulated by the Constitution, among others health and 
social care. The autonomy of cantons creates strong heterogeneity in terms of regulatory 
systems and the organization of health care services. Moreover, the State’s financial 
contribution varies in size and form according to the 26 different legal frameworks. 
Instead of having one single health system, Switzerland can be seen as 26 micro-
systems linked to each other by the Federal Health Insurance Act (FHIA), which came 
into force on January 1st, 1996. The present-day differences between cantons make 
Switzerland a natural laboratory where to develop some interesting economic analyses 
and observations that might be useful for countries set on reorganizing their health 
systems in a federal way.  
In the first part of the paper we present an overview of Switzerland’s health care system, 
focussing in particular on the role of federalism and on the differences between 
compulsory health insurance premiums and per-capita health expenses in the cantons. 
The second part of the paper presents an econometric analysis, using panel data over the 
period 1996-2001, of the most important determinants in the cantonal health care 
expenditures. Following the approach of Gerdtham and Jönsson (2000) for international 
health comparisons, we consider demographic, socio-economic, and production 
capacity factors as explanatory variables of the model.  
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1. Introduction  
Switzerland (7.2 million inhabitant s) is a federal state of 26 cantons. Article 3 of the 
Swiss Constitution grants a high degree of autonomy to the cantons, stating that “The 
cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal 
Constitution; they shall exercise all rights which are not transferred to the 
Confederation”. The precept of the Swiss decentralization is that public policies and 
their implementation should be assigned to the lowest level of government capable of 
achieving the objectives. 
The organization of the health care system is under the responsibility and control of 
the cantons. Decentralization of competences and of expenditure responsibility has led 
to a series of significant differences among cantons with respect to per-capita public 
spending, the regulatory settings, the role of private versus public sector, and the level 
of production capacity. Instead of being a single health-care system, Switzerland is 
composed of 26 sub-systems, connected to each other by the Federal Health Insurance 
Act (FHIA) that has been in force since January 1st, 1996. Health insurance is 
mandatory for all residents (premiums are regulated by the state; they are risk 
independent but not income-dependent) and covers a package of health-care benefits 
defined by law. Notwithstanding the fact that this package is the same throughout 
Switzerland, there are some significant differences in the regional health-care 
expenditures.  
The aim of this study is to analyse the determinants that cause the differences in the 
per-capita health care expenditures between the Swiss cantons. The literature regarding 
the determinants of health expenditures is also surveyed in order to place the results of 
this paper into proper context. In particular, we will refer to Gerdtham and Jönsson’s 
studies.1 Moreover, the paper will provide some considerations on the impact of 
federalism on the organization of the Swiss health-care sector. The discussion is of 
interest because this process of decentralization is seen as a central tenet of health sector 
reform in many European countries. It is an effective way to stimulate improvements in 
service delivery, to secure better allocation of resources according to needs, to involve 
the community in decision about priorities and to facilitate the reduction in inequities in 
                                                 
1 See Gerdtham and Jönsson (2000). 
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health-care provision. Thus, Switzerland may be taken as an example, since the origin 
of federalism dates back to a good many years. 
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we present the main features of the 
Swiss health care system and show the impact of federalism on the organization of the 
health care sector in Switzerland; section 3 is devoted to the analysis of the present 
literature in this area; in sections 4 and 5 we discuss the specification of the model and 
submit the empirical estimation results of the panel data set. Conclusions are drawn in 
section 6. 
 
2. The Swiss health care system 
In 2001 health care costs reached SFr 46 billion. This value corresponds to 11.1% of 
GDP. Therefore Switzerland ranks first among European countries with respect to per-
capita health expenditures (3275 PPP-$). 
The Swiss health care system is based on a mixed (private-social) health insurance 
system. The main characteristics of this system can be summarized in the following 
eight points: 
1. it is a mixed (private-social) health insurance system, with about 100 competing 
private insurance companies (sickness funds) on the one hand and some 
characteristics of social insurance on the other hand. These characteristics are: 
regulated and risk- independent premiums, mandatory health insurance for all 
residents (since 1996), and a subsidy designed to help people with low income 
pay their health insurance premiums;  
2. the package of services covered by the mandatory insurance is laid down in the 
insurance contracts; however, since 1996 the basic contract has been defined by 
the Confederation and therefore it is by law the same for all residents;  
3. both public and private hospitals, as well as nursing homes, offer inpatient health 
care, which (in most cases) is still reimbursed on a per diem basis 2; however, 
only public- interest hospitals receive financial support from the state (i.e. from 
the cantons) in the form of subsidies, while private hospitals have to finance 
their cost totally through health insurers’ reimbursement. Moreover, cantons 
have to plan hospital capacity and only hospitals included in the cantonal lists 
are entitled to be reimbursed by mandatory health insurance; 
                                                 
2 The introduction of AP-DRG reimbursement in some cantons started in 2000. 
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4. ambulatory health care services are provided by independent general 
practitioners and specialists, and are reimbursed according to a fee-for-service 
scheme;  
5. the insured can freely choose the service provider (general practitioner, 
specialist) because of compulsory contracting. The compulsory contracting 
principle states that all medical practitioners who are authorized to practise as 
independent professionals in Switzerland have the right to be party to a 
framework contract with any of the sickness funds; 
6. the service fees are regulated and defined according to agreements concluded 
between the service provider associations, the health insurance companies and 
the state;  
7. many services are simultaneously financed by multiple payers (the state and the 
mandatory health insurance or the mandatory health insurance and 
complementary private insurers); 
8. compared to other EU-countries, public financing of the health care system is 
very limited.  
The financing model and the allocation of competences between the Confederation and 
cantons  
In Switzerland the funding model of the health system is particularly regressive (see 
table 1). Overall, only one-third of the financing is collected in an income-dependent 
way (this concerns public financing, which in 2001 amounted to 26.8% of total health 
expenses3, and social insurance contributions – 6.4%). Moreover, public contribution is 
predominantly provided by cantons and municipalities, whereas the Confederation 
contributes only 20% to the public health care budget. The remaining two-thirds of the 
financing, which do not depend on the citizens’ ability to pay, include, in particular, 
mandatory health insurance premiums (26.5%), premiums for private complementary 
insurance (10.2%), co-payment of insured services (5.3%) and out-of-pocket expenses 
(23.9%). It is worth noting that the proportion of expenses borne by patients is 
considerable. When co-payment for insured services and the out-of-pocket health 
expenses are added, the share charged to patients reaches the threshold of 30% of total 
                                                 
3 This quota is divided into shares of 16.9% for public financing of hospitals and nursing homes, 8.3% for 
subsidies to the less wealthy citizens in the form of a public contribution to the payment of the mandatory 
health insurance premiums and of nursing homes daily rates, and 1.6% for public subsidies to other social 
insurances that participate in the health care expenditure.  
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health expenditures and corresponds to an annual per capita amount of SFr 1,852 (about 
955 PPP-$).  
Table 1 Health care financing in Switzerland (2001)  
  Sfr million in % 
Public financing of direct cost (in particular 
subsidies to public hospitals) 7,802.5 16.9% 
Public subsidies to health insurance 
premiums and nursing homes’ daily rates of 
the less wealthy citizens  2,671.6 5.8% 
Other public subsidies to social insurance 1,879.6 4.1% 
Total expenditure financed through general 
taxation 12,353.7 26.8% 
Accident insurance (UV) 1,475.3 3.2% 
Other social insurances (AHV, IV, MV) 1,472.5 3.2% 
Total expenditure financed through payroll 
taxes 2,947.8 6.4% 
Mandatory health insurance premiums 12,215.1 26.5% 
Private health insurance premiums 
(complementary insurance) 4,699.9 10.2% 
\Co-payment for insured services 2,428.3 5.3% 
Out-of-pocket payments 11,021.2 23.9% 
Other private financing 463.5 1.0% 
Total expenditure privately financed  3,'828.0 66.8% 
Total health expenditure 46,129.5 100.0% 
 Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Kosten des Gesundheitswesens, Neuchâtel, 
2003. 
Switzerland’s peculiarity is highlighted in the triangle of health care financing 
depicted in figure 1. The closer a country is to the triangle’s hypotenuse, the higher the 
health care expenditures share financed according to the citizens’ paying ability 
(progressive general taxation or proportional payroll taxes). The closer it is to the lower 
left corner, the greater the use of private financing schemes.  
USA 
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Figure 1 Health care financing triangle  
  Source: Wagstaff et al (1999).  
Switzerland’s position in 2001 is in sharp contrast with all the other European 
countries (which are all within a range of income-dependent financing between 65% 
and 80% of health care expenditures) and resembles the situation in the United States. 
The particular structure of the health care financing scheme has two main consequences:  
- the Swiss health care system does not attach much importance to the principle of 
equity of financing. According to the World Bank (2000), vertical equity means 
that “those who are in different circumstances with respect to a characteristic of 
concern for equity should, correspondingly, be treated differently”. Vertical 
equity implies that citizens with greater economic means have to pay more. 
Therefore, the larger the share of progressive (or at least income-proportional) 
financing, the greater the vertical equity of the financing of a health care system. 
The fact that the mandatory health insurance premiums are income-independent 
and that citizens have to finance directly (or through private insurances) 40.3% 
of total expenditure4, leads to a highly regressive financing model.5 This has 
negative repercussions especially on the medium income class, which does not 
benefit from subsidies for the payment of the insurance premiums. The goal of 
these subsidies is to help those people on a low-income level, and thus to 
                                                 
4 This percentage results from the sum of private health insurance premiums, co-payment for insured 
services, out-of-pocket financing and other private funding. 
5 Wagstaff et al. (1999) have published a comparative study on the equity of financing in OECD 
countries, where Switzerland ranked last. 
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improve the level of vertical equity across the country. However, we should bear 
in mind that these subsidies cover only one part of the population6; 
- the presence of a large number of third-party payers makes it extremely complex 
to follow the financial flows, which in turn makes it more difficult to manage the 
health care expenditures in general, and leads to a cost shifting problem. Since 
nobody is entirely responsible for the global health care budget, it is sometimes 
easier for a single financing body to obtain a reduction in its own financial share, 
rather than to engage in a more rational use of total health care spending. This 
encourages shifting costs at the expense of another payer, rather than looking for 
solutions allowing an effective rationalisation of expenditure.  
Although the state’s presence in the Swiss health care system cannot be considered 
to be financially very strong, it is definitely stronger in terms of regulatory activity. As 
far as allocation of competences is concerned, cantons are legally entitled to legislate on 
all health care matters except for a few issues that explicitly fall within the competence 
of the Confederation. Almost all cantons have passed cantonal health care laws and 
specific provisions regulating the application of the federal health insurance legislation. 
According to the Constitution, each canton enjoys decision-making autonomy in 
planning health care institutions (particularly hospitals and nursing homes), in settling 
which competences are to be delegated to local authorities, and in vocational training. In 
other words, cantons guarantee accessibility, effectiveness and efficiency of health 
services to their population, while the Confederation is responsible only for the 
regulation of health insurance.  
Since 1996 the Confederation has played a more active role in the health care sector. 
Health insurance became compulsory at a federal level, through the enforcement of the 
Federal Health Insurance Act. A package of basic health services was defined for the 
whole Swiss population. However, the additional decision-making powers of the central 
body were not supported by a formal devolution of competences from the cantons to the 
Confederation (which would have required a change in the Constitution) nor by a 
redistribution of public health expenditures for a greater engagement of the 
Confederation (see Crivelli and Filippini, 2003). 
                                                 
6 About one-third of the Swiss population benefits from the subsidy system. The rest are liable to health 
premiums that are regressive to their income. Moreover, on account of federalism, subsidy policies vary 
from one canton to another, creating strong territorial disparities. For example in 2002, one household 
with two children with a yearly gross income of SFr 70,000, had a medium health premium incidence of 
8.2% of the disposable income across the country, with a minimum of 1.2% in Canton Valais and 13.8% 
in Canton Geneva. 
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The organizational autonomy granted to cantons in the last 90 years has created a 
very heterogeneous system both in the delivery of health care services and in the level 
of public health financing, giving rise to concerns about social and territorial inequity.  
Such a marked decentralisation of the organization and financing of the health care 
system has no parallel in other countries with a federal setting such as Canada or 
Germany. In these countries, central government plays a more active role in the 
financing of the health care sector.7 Moreover, since the regional entities are much 
larger than the Swiss cantons, regional differences are not as marked and the problems 
connected to the presence of micro-systems are not as significant. 
Consequences of federalism for the organization of the health care system in 
Switzerland  
Decentralisation of competences and expenditure has led to a series of significant 
inter-cantonal differences with regard to public financing and the regulatory settings, as 
well as to production capacity.  
The socialized health expenditures, including services covered by mandatory health 
insurance as well as public health expenditures, in 2001 ranged from per capita 1051 
PPP-$ in the Canton of Appenzell to per capita 2781 PPP-$ in Geneva (see figure 2). 
Public health expenditures can be calculated by combining two fundamental elements: 
(a) cantonal and local direct financing for the provision of health care services to the 
population (in particular the subsidies to public and private, public- interest hospitals, the 
participation in hospitalisations outside the home canton, the subsidies to nursing homes 
and to home care services) and (b) financial support to the less wealthy in the form of 
subsidies to meet health insurance premiums.8  
                                                 
7 See Banting and Corbett (2002). 
8 Before 1996 the state subsidized health insurance companies directly, while since 1996 subsides have 
been given to needy people. With the FHIA a social goal was established: the purpose of state subsidies is 
to keep the ratio between net premiums and taxable income below 8% for the poorest citizens. In general, 
the burden of premiums has increased considerably in the last few years and fewer and fewer cantons 
achieve this social goal. 
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Figure 2 Per-capita socialized health expenditures in Swiss cantons (2001), PPP-$ 
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Source: UFS (2003), Coûts du système de santé, Neuchâtel. UFAS (2002), Statistiques de 
l'assurance-maladie 2001, Berne, Santesuisse. 
The high degree of autonomy granted to cantons in the definition of local public 
policies has caused marked differences also in the concept of equity of financing. Figure 
3 represents the subdivision in percentages of socialized health expenditures into two 
elements: (1) public financing through taxes, (2) financing through income-independent 
health premiums. Some cantons (generally those with high levels of socialized health 
expenditures, as Basel-City and Geneva) show a 50% of expenses covered by general 
taxation, while others (Aargau and Thurgau) show 30%. 
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Figure 3 Share of socialized health expenditures financed through general taxation 
and through per-capita premiums in Swiss cantons (2001) 
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Source: UFS and UFAS (2003), and own presentation of data. 
The main reasons explaining these differences in the financing mix are the 
following: 
1) Financing of subsidies through general taxation is ensured to the extent of two-
thirds by the Confederation and one-third by cantons. The distribution of the 
Confederation’s funds and the financial participation of the cantons are 
established on the basis of an equalizing allocation system, depending on the 
financial strength of each canton. However, out of respect for the federalism that 
distinguishes the institutional order in Switzerland, the task of implementing the 
distribution system of subsidies rests with the cantons. The 26 cantonal systems 
of subsidies differ greatly one from the other, in terms of technical profile as 
well as effectiveness. At present, because cantonal systems are very different, it 
is very difficult to compare cantons. Policies designed for specific classes of the 
population (for instance families with children) may turn out to be ineffective 
when dealing with other social groups (for example singles). The threshold for 
obtaining subsidies for the mandatory health insurance, in the case of a married 
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couple with two children, varies from 20,000 PPP-$ of taxable income in Canton 
Ticino (TI) to 54,000 PPP-$ in Basel-Country (BL).  
2) The second reason is the frequency of the institutional forms in the hospital 
sector. In figure 4 a pie-chart has been drawn for each canton. The pie surface 
represents the total number of hospitals operating in a specific canton, whereas 
the two pie slices represent the relative weight of public and private subsidized 
hospitals in comparison with non-subsidized private institutions. The public-
private mix has a strong impact on the financing model of mandatory health 
care. The higher the percentage of private hospitals in a canton, the higher the 
share covered by means of health insurance premiums  
 
Figure 4: Comparison between public or subsidized, private acute hospitals and 
private clinics in the different Swiss cantons (year 2000) 
Source:  UFS, Informations sur le projet "Statistiques des établissements de santé (soins 
intra-muros), StatSanté 1/2002, 17. 
Consequently, cantons contribute less to the total expenditure, as they have to 
subsidize only beds in public and public-interest hospitals. Therefore they can 
reduce the revenues of general taxation (and taxes are collected progressively 
according to tax-payers’ income). More private hospital beds imply, ceteris 
paribus, a greater iniquity of financing. In this sense the hospital situation in 
Ticino, Thurgau, Geneva and Appenzell Outer-Rhodes appears to be rather 
peculiar, as it is characterized by a clear prevalence of private non-subsidised 
hospitals. 
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If we consider the level of insurance premiums we notice significant differences not 
only between the various cantons (figure 5) but also within the single cantons (basic 
health insurance is offered by several insurance companies, which calculate their 
premiums on a cantonal basis). The box-plot shows the median, maximum, and 
minimum premium values for each canton and the concentration of the distribution of 
the premiums paid by 50% of the cantonal population (the box-plot rectangle shows the 
dispersion between the first and the third quartile). The highest premium of all (more 
than SFr. 380 per month) was paid in Canton Geneva, the lowest (less than SFr. 120) 
was paid in Valais (VS). The highest cantonal average premium (SFr. 336) is to be 
found in Geneva, whereas the lowest average premium (SFr. 145) can be found in 
Appenzell Inner-Rhodes.  
 
Figure 5 Inter-cantonal and infra-cantonal differences in adult premiums in 2001 
 
 
 
 Source: UFAS (2001), Statistiques de l'assurance-maladie 1999, Berne.  
There are also very marked differences between cantons with regard to the 
production capacity in the health care sector. The first aspect we would like to consider 
is the density of acute beds (table 2). The national average is 362 acute beds per 100,000 
inhabitants, but three cantons exceed this average by over 35% [Ticino (TI): 539 beds; 
Appenzell Inner-Rhodes (AI): 646 beds and Basel-City (BS): 715 beds], and 2 cantons 
with a density over 35% lower than the national average [Zug (ZG): 203 beds and 
Schwyz (SZ): 233 beds].  
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Table 2 Density of acute beds and density of medical practices per 100,000 
inhabitants (year 2001) 
 Canton 
Density of acute 
beds per 100,000 
inhabitants 
Density of 
medical 
practices per 
100,000 
inhabitants 
Canton 
Density of acute 
beds per 100,000 
inhabitants  
Density of 
medical 
practices per 
100,000 
inhabitants 
Argau (AG) 341 138 Nidwalden (NW) 243 110 
Appenzell Inner-Rhodes 
(AI) 646 109 Obwalden (OW) 277 105 
Appenzell Outer-Rhodes 
(AR) 244 153 St Gall (SG) 331 156 
Berne (BE) 377 200 Schaffhausen (SH) 299 184 
Basel-Country (BL) 346 187 Solothurn (SO) 336 156 
Basel-City (BS) 715 357 Schwyz (SZ) 233 117 
Fribourg (FR) 330 142 Thurgovia (TG) 241 126 
Geneva (GE) 380 326 Ticino (TI) 539 194 
Glarus (GL) 316 129 Uri (UR) 424 129 
Grisons (GR) 360 164 Vaud (VD) 435 239 
Jura (JU) 409 149 Valais (VS) 332 169 
Lucerne (LU) 291 145 Zug (VS) 203 158 
Neuchâtel (NE) 406 205 Zurich (ZH) 366 223 
Swiss average 362 172 
 Source: UFS, Statistiques des établissements de santé (soins intra-muros), 2001, and Encyclopédie 
Statistique de la Suisse. 
There is a real gap with respect to the density of medical practices. The data range 
from more than 300 medical practices per 100,000 inhabitants in Basel-City and Geneva 
to 100-110 practices per 100,000 inhabitants in Obwalden (OW), Nidwalden, and 
Appenzell Inner-Rhodes, whereas the national average is 172. In Switzerland all doctors 
who have obtained a Swiss university degree in medicine and have at least two years’ 
hospital experience are automatically entitled to practise independently and to invoice 
for their services at the expense of the mandatory health insurance according to a fee-
for-service scheme (the fees were fixed on a cantonal basis in a specific price list for 
medical services; and this went on till 2003).9 Of course this payment system could 
easily lead to a phenomenon of supply- induced demand. Note that from 2004 the same 
reimbursement system will apply to all cantons. 
                                                 
9 The health insurance companies are obliged to cooperate with all the medical practitioners entitled to 
practise independently within the framework of the coverage provided for by the Federal Health 
Insurance Act (FHIA). Service-providers can be excluded from the reimbursement of the mandatory 
health insurance only in the case of citizens who have voluntarily joined a managed care insurance 
scheme.  
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Swiss cantons also show differences with respect to the mortality rate amenable to 
health care, defined by Nolte and McKee (2003) as deaths from certain causes that 
should not occur in the presence of timely and effective health care. These differences 
are depicted in figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 Differences in the average mortality rate amenable to health care in Swiss 
cantons for the period 1995 - 1999 
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Source: DSS,Dipartimento della sanitá e socialitá del Canton Ticino (2003). 
This descriptive analysis of the organization of the Swiss health care system sheds 
light on the fact that the federal structure has created marked differences between local 
governments affecting per-capita health expenditures, the structure of supply, and equity 
of financing. Moreover, some cantonal differences in the outcome of the systems are 
also observed. 
We believe that in a small country like Switzerland it would be desirable for the 
central government to be more involved in the regulation and financing of the health 
sector. This would indeed promote a more coordinated and efficient organization of the 
sector, while preserving the principle of federalism. The European countries that are 
going through a decentralization process in the health care sector should bear in mind 
that extreme decentralization could give rise to problems of regional disparities.  
 
3. The literature  
In the last decades all OECD countries have experienced a huge increase in health 
care expenditure and in the share of GDP represented by the health sector. This trend 
has affected the bulk of countries and drawn attention to health economics. A body of 
literature started examining the determinants of health expenditures and, thanks to the 
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use of econometric methods, suggestions on variables that have an impact on the health 
costs have been given. Most studies have estimated the relation between per-capita 
health care expenditure and its determinants, namely: the proportion of population over 
65 and under 5, per-capita GDP, the public finance share of health care spending, 
urbanization, and the number of practising physicians per capita.  
Recently, the same determinants approach has been applied not to international 
comparisons but to the national level. This study belongs to the latter category insofar as 
our analysis deals with the Swiss cantons only.  
The first generation of studies at the international level has focused mainly on the 
estimation of the elasticity of health care expenditures with respect to per-capita GDP. 
Newhouse (1977) regresses per-capita medical expenditures on per-capita GDP on 13 
OECD countries and finds income elasticity for health care spending greater than one, 
thus leading to the conclusion that medical care is a luxury good. This result has been 
later confirmed by some other studies. Leu (1986), for example, using cross-sectional 
data for 19 OECD countries, finds income elasticity higher than one. However, he 
introduces in his analysis a set of important variables (like dummy variables) for 
countries with a national health system and countries based on a public insurance 
scheme, dummy variables where there is direct democracy, and variables that reflect the 
public offer of health services. Gerdtham et al. (1992) used a single cross-section of 19 
OECD countries in 1987 and reported per-capita income, urbanization, and the share of 
public financing to total health expenditures as positive and significant variables with a 
reported income elasticity of 1.33. 
The second generation studies use panel sample of OECD countries. A main feature 
of the studies belonging to this data, combining cross-country and time-series data, is 
the introduction of variables describing the regulatory settings and the production 
capacity of health services. Hitiris and Posnett (1992) used panel data observations from 
20 OECD countries over the period 1960-1987 and found a strong and positive 
correlation between per capita health spending and GDP with income elasticity at about 
unity. Other variables were included in the model and the share of over 65 in the 
population was found to be positive and significant. Gerdtham et al. (1998) used a panel 
data set for 22 OECD countries over the period 1970-1991, including in the model 
variables like the per-capita number of physicians and the regulatory set-ups  of each 
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single country. This is the most complete study at the international level. Amongst the 
non institutional factors, only GDP and tobacco consumption generally have a 
significant impact on health expenditures: the elasticity of tobacco consumption 
indicates that health expenditures would increase by about 1.3% if tobacco consumption 
increased by 10%. Countries with primary physicians as gatekeepers for inpatient care 
have consistently lower health expenditures (costs drop by 16%). Public reimbursement 
systems tend to be less expensive than public contract systems. Countries that reimburse 
their physicians by capitation appear to experience lower health expenditures; the 
proportion of inpatient care expenditures tends to be positively related to health 
expenditures; the public sector is relatively more important than the private sector and 
helps lower the costs. Furthermore, it seems that the number of doctors swells health 
expenditures in systems that reimburse their physicians by fee-for-service. In contrast 
with other studies, the estimated income elasticity is lower than one (0.74).  
Barros (1998) focuses his study on the determinants of growth of aggregate health 
expenditures. The study has its starting point in previous literature but looks at 
differences across countries in growth, and not in levels, of health expenditures. Barros 
basically uses the same explanatory variables, but he gets different results. Health 
system characteristics usually believed to influence health expenditures growth, like 
population ageing, the type of health system and existence of gatekeepers, are found to 
be non-significant. The only exception is the income variable, with elasticity below but 
close to one. 
Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998) used a pooled time-series cross-section approach to 
study the growth of real per-capita provincial government health care expenditures in 
Canada. Some of the problems that have affected the international studies are thus not 
present here and therefore this obviously simplifies the analysis. The data set consists of 
10 provincial annual time-series over the period 1965-1991. The income elasticity of 
real per-capita provincial government health expenditures is lower than one at 0.77. 
Hence, this result suggests that health care expenditures are indeed more of a necessity 
than a luxury good. The proportion of provincia l population aged over 65 is significant 
and has a large impact, as well as federal transfers.  
Crivelli, Filippini and Mosca (2003) investigated the differences in health care 
expenditures between Swiss cantons using a panel data set. Data cover 26 cantons over 
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the years 1996-2000. The income elasticity is found not to be significant but the other 
major variables carry the expected sign and are significant: the most important factors 
explaining health expenditures are physicians’ density and the density of acute beds, the 
age structure of the population, and the unemployment rate. Compared to the study of 
Crivelli et al. (2003), in this paper we will use a data set that covers the period 1996-
2001 and a more detailed model specification. 
In Table 4 we present the main characteristics of four reference studies. Hitiris and 
Posnett (1992) and Gerdtham et al. (1998) belong to the category of panel data studies 
at the international level, while Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998) and Crivelli et al. 
(2003) belong to the more recent category of comparative regional studies.  
 
Table 4 Characteristics of three reference studies 
 Countries Data set No. of 
variables (No. 
dummies) 
Significant 
explicative factors  
Hitiris e 
Posnett (1992) 
20 OECD 
countries 
Panel data 
1960-1987  
4 (2) GDP per capita, 
population aged over 
65 
Gerdtham 
(1998)  
22 OCSE 
countries 
Panel data 
1970-1991 
3 (9) Tobacco consumption, 
income per capita, 
gatekeeping model, 
reimbursement model, 
physicians’ 
remuneration with 
capitation, importance 
of ambulatory  care 
vs. hospital care, 
physicians’ density, 
importance of the 
public sector vs. the 
private sector.  
Di Matteo e Di 10 Canadian Panel data 14 (10) GDP per capita, 
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Matteo (1998)  provinces 1965-1991 population over 65, 
federal transfers per 
capita. 
Crivelli, 
Filippini and 
Mosca (2003) 
26 Swiss 
cantons 
Panel data 
1996-2000 
7 (1) Physicians’ density, 
population aged over 
75, population aged 
below 5, 
unemployment rate, 
density of acute beds. 
 
4. Model specification and estimates 
In this study we use a single equation approach to model the per-capita cantonal 
expenditures on health care services. We postulate that per-capita health expenditures 
depend on some economic, demographic and structural factors. Following the model 
specifications used in previous studies and taking into account the availability and 
quality of data for the Swiss cantons, we decided to specify the following parsimonious 
cantonal health expenditures model: 
SHEit = f (Yit, UNit, POit, A75it, A05it, MOit, DPit, DDIit, PHYit, BEDSit, MCARE, T)   [1] 
where subscript i stands for the canton and t for the year. Moreover, 
SHEit =  socialized health expenditures per capita (which is obtained by the sum of the 
per capita public health expenditures and expenses covered by the mandatory 
insurance);  
Yit =  per-capita income;  
UNit =  unemployment rate, calculated as the ratio of the unemployed over the 
working population; 
POit =  poverty rate, calculated as the percentage of households with an income below 
50% of the average cantonal income;10  
A75it =  percentage of population older than 75;  
A05it =  percentage of population aged under 5;  
                                                 
10 See Connolly and Munro (1999) for a discussion on different measures of poverty. 
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MOit =  mortality rate amenable to health care. This rate is based on the concept that 
deaths from certain causes should not occur in the presence of timely and 
effective health care;11  
DPit =  population density, calculated as the ratio of the population to the Canton’s 
area; 
DDIit =  cantonal index for direct democracy. Direct democracy is defined in terms of 
individual political participation possibilities. The index was calculated by 
Trechsel and Serdült (1999) and Frey and Stutzer (2000); 
PHYit =  physicians’ density (physicians per 100,000 inhabitants); 
BEDSit = density of acute beds in hospitals per 100,000 inhabitants; 
MCARE = percentage of cantonal population opting for a managed care programme;  
T =  time variable which should capture the cost differences over time owing to 
changes in medical technology or to other factors that may influence the 
development of health costs at the national level. 
Compared to the model specification used by Crivelli et al. (2003), model [1] 
includes the following additional variables: poverty rate, mortality rate, population 
density, index for direct democracy, and managed care programmes. Moreover the 
period of analysis has been increased by one year. 
Estimation of equation [1] requires the specification of a functional form. The 
log- log form offers an appropriate functional form for answering questions about the 
elasticities of health expenditures. The major advantage, of course, is that the estimated 
coefficients amount to elasticities, which are therefore assumed to be constant.  
By applying the log-log functional form, expression [1] can be written as 
 
ln SHEit = b0 + b1 lnYit + b2 lnUNit + b3 lnPOit + b4 lnA75it + b5 lnA05it +  
                 b6 lnMOit + b7 lnDPit + b8 lnDDIit + b9 lnPHYit + b10 lnBEDSit +  
b11 lnMCARE + b12 T + eit                                                                             [2] 
 
                                                 
11 See Nolte and McKee (2003) for a more detailed discussion on this issue. 
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5. Data and estimation results 
The econometric estimation of model [2] is based on a combination of time-series 
and cross-section data for 26 cantons over the period 1996-2001.12 These data were 
obtained from some annual publications by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office and 
from some yearly publications by Santésuisse, an association that groups together all 
insurance companies.13 Note that, for some variables, only one value is available for the 
whole period analysed. These variables are: poverty rate, mortality rate, and index of 
direct democracy. Therefore model [1] includes these three time- invariant variables. 
Table 5 gives some statistical details on the variables employed in the estimation of 
model [2]. 
 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics of the variables employed 
Variables Unit of  
measurement 
Minimum Median Maximum 
Socialized Health 
Expenditures per capita 
(SHE) 
SFr/inhabitant 1526.8 2520.6 5397.0 
Income per capita (Y) SFr/inhabitant 30191 41158 84605 
Unemployment rate (UN) Unemployed/ working 
population  
0.003 0.025 0.078 
Poverty rate (PO) % of households with 
an income below 50% 
the average income 
0.127 0.173 0.237 
Over 75 (A75) Over 75/population  0.049 0.069 0.107 
Under 5 (A05)  Under 5/population 0.042 0.059 0.080 
Mortality rate (MO) Rate of mortality 
amenable to health care 
22.39 29.84 48.76 
Population density (DP) Population/canton’s 
area  
26.10 206.10 5267.9 
Direct democracy index 
(DDI) 
Index from 1 
(minimum) to 6 
(maximum) 
1.75 4.45 5.69 
Physicians’ density (PHY) Physicians/100'000 
inhabitants 
76.20 152.25 357.15 
                                                 
12 It is worth pointing out that some variables of the model show a high within variation while others 
show a low within variation. 
13 For more detailed statistics see: 
http://www.statistik.admin.ch/stat_ch/ber14/gewe/dtfr14i.htm (intramuros statistics) and 
http://www.statistik.admin.ch/dienstle/elektron/dstatinf.htm (database Statweb) 
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Density of acute beds (BEDS) Beds/100'000 
inhabitants 
109 374 1098 
Managed Care (MCARE) % of cantonal 
population with a 
mcare programme 
0.09 3.33 25.72 
Density of acute beds (BEDS) Beds/100'000 
inhabitants 
109 374 1098 
 
Concerning the choice of econometric technique, it should be noted that in the 
econometric literature we can find various types of models focusing on cross-sectional 
variation, i.e., heterogeneity across units. The three most widely used approaches are: 
the OLS model, the fixed-effects (LSDV) model, and the random-effects model 
(GLS).14 In the OLS model, a common intercept as well as common slope coefficients 
are assumed across individuals and time periods. The main difference between the OLS 
and LSDV models involves the constant term. By introducing a complete set of cross-
section dummy variables, LSDV allows a separate constant term for each unit. The third 
type is the random-effects model. While there are several alternative ways to specify the 
error components, the most common is to assume that the individual constants are 
random variables. In this case, differences between units are not viewed as parametric 
shifts of the regression function as in the LSDV model, but as randomly distributed 
shocks. Moreover, using the LSDV model it is not possible to estimate the parameters 
of time- invariant variables, e.g., the poverty rate, the mortality rate and the direct 
democracy index. Equation [2] is estimated using the fixed-effects model (LSDV) and 
the random-effects model (GLS).  
Table 6 presents the final regression results of the LSDV and GLS estimations: 
 
Table 6  Econometric results  
Coefficients LSDV model 
Cantonal Health 
Expenditure  
GLS model 
Cantonal Health 
Expenditure  
b0  9.846*** 
(1.464) 
10.855*** 
(1.240) 
b1 - 0.205*** 
(0.073) 
- 0.171** 
(0.068) 
b2 0.038** 
(0.019) 
0.034** 
(0.017) 
                                                 
14  For a detailed presentation of the econometric methods that have been used to analyse panel data, 
see Balestra  and Nerlove (1966), Greene (2000) and Hsiao (2002). 
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b3 - 
- 
0.161 
(0.164) 
b4 0.800*** 
(0.252) 
0.555*** 
(0.144) 
b5 - 0.025 
(0.202) 
- 0.142 
(0.179) 
b6 - 
- 
- 0.282* 
(0.159) 
b7 0.215 
(0.145) 
0.062*** 
(0.023) 
b8 - 
- 
- 0.109 
(0.082) 
b9 0.243* 
(0.128) 
0.200** 
(0.099) 
b10 - 0.012 
(0.016) 
- 0.006 
(0.016) 
b11 0.007 
(0.013) 
- 0.016 
(0.010) 
b12 0.035*** 
(0.007) 
0.039*** 
(0.006) 
Within R2 
Between R2 
Overall R2 
0.830  
0.554 
0.562 
0.822 
0.833 
0.832 
 
*, **, ***: significantly different from zero at the 90, 95 and 99% confidence level.  
In order to screen for individual effects we used the test of the Lagrange multiplier 
for the random effect model. The test result tells us that the random effect model (GLS) 
is to be preferred to the ordinary least square model (OLS). Furthermore, we applied the 
Hausmann test to verify the superiority of the random-effects model with respect to the 
fixed-effects model. The test shows that the random-effects model is to be preferred. 
Therefore the following comments are based on the results obtained with the GLS 
model. However, as table 6 shows, most coefficients in both models show similar 
values. 
Most of the results reported in table 6 are satisfactory. It is worth noting that in both 
models, the bulk of coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero and 
carry the expected sign. The adjusted R2 is high both in the LSDV model and in the 
GLS model.  
The log- log transformation permits us to consider the estimated coefficients as 
elasticities. The econometric results show that most of the variables have a positive 
impact on cantonal health care expenses.  
The estimation with the random effects model points out that the income elasticity is 
negative and is significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. At first 
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sight, this result may appear surprising, since normally in the international literature 
[Gerdtham et al. (1998), Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998), Manning et al. ((1987)] 
income elasticity is the most important factor explaining health expenditures, and it 
carries a positive sign. However, this result may be due to the way the Swiss health care 
system is organized. As previously discussed, in Switzerland all citizens are obliged by 
law to take out a health insurance policy, which covers some specific services: this is 
the mandatory and basic insurance. Citizens are also offered an additional private 
insurance, which is not compulsory and offers a package of additional health care 
services. Moreover, these private insurance plans also cover part of the basic services 
normally financed by the state. This type of insurance is normally chosen by wealthier 
people, as it tends to be rather expensive. The negative sign of the income coefficient 
may explain this effect: the higher the average income in one canton, the lower the 
socialized health expenditures; in fact individuals opt for the optional and private 
insurance, and the expenditures of these insurance companies are not included in the 
variable SHE. 15 
With respect to the unemployment rate, a 10% increase in it is associated with 
0.34% increase in the socialized health expenditures. This latter result confirms the 
recent debate on the impact of social policies and the socio-economic determinants of 
health. The coefficient for the cantonal poverty rate is not significantly different from 
zero.16 This result could be explained by the fact that the poverty rate in Switzerland, 
measured with this indicator, is lower than in other European countries. 
The coefficient for the percentage of population over 75 is positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 99% confidence level. This result confirms the hypothesis that 
an older population tends to cause higher health expenditures, because of the increased 
incidence of illnesses as insanity or other chronic diseases, as well as proximity to the 
time of death of the elderly.17 A 10% increase in people aged over 75 would cause a 
5.6% increase in health costs. 
The level of health expenditures is also conditioned on the mortality rate amenable 
to health care. This is an important variable because it can be considered as a proxy 
                                                 
15 Note that the system has changed since 2001. This implies that from 2002 private insurances do not 
have to cover anymore part of the basic services. 
16 For a more detailed discussion of this issue please refer to the UFS, Enquête Suisse sur la santé 2002 . 
17 See Zweifel at al. (1999).  
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variable for the outcome of a health care sector. As expected, it has a negative sign and 
is statistically different from zero at the 90% confidence interval. If the canton’s 
mortality rate amenable to health care decreases by 10%, then health expenditures 
increase by 2.82%. This result shows that cantons with low mortality rate have higher 
per-capita health expenditures. 
Another important factor that explains our model is the cantonal population density. 
This variable has been used as a proxy for the urbanization level in each region of 
Switzerland. It is highly significant and carries a positive sign. This could confirm 
previous studies on the international comparisons of health expenditures. The more 
populated a specific region is, the higher its health expenditures, since diseases spread 
faster and have a higher impact in these areas than in rural ones. However, another 
interpretation is that the supply of medical services is higher in populated areas and 
therefore there are lower transaction costs for people benefiting from the health care, 
which in turn increases the probability of success of supply- induced demand strategies. 
As the previous section should have made clear, DDI represents a variable 
introduced in the model to test a hypothesis of the local public choice theory. With this 
variable we tried to capture the preferences expressed by citizens with respect to health 
policies. In the public choice literature, it is argued that the more citizens can express 
their preferences, the more public goods will be fashioned according to their tastes (see 
Oates [1972 and 1999], Leu [1986], Frey [1994]). The coefficient of this variable turns 
out to be statistically not significantly different from zero but, as we expected, it carries 
a negative sign. A negative sign implies that in those cantons where direct democracy is 
stronger, health care expenditures are generally lower because citizens’ preferences are 
taken more seriously, and waste contained.18  
The elasticity of physicians’ density has a positive value. In other words, an increase 
in the number of physicians causes an increase in the cantonal socialized health 
expenditures. A 10% increase in physicians’ density is linked with a 2.0% increase in 
health costs. This latter result might highlight the supplier- induced demand problem. In 
fact, doctors are paid through a fee-for-service scheme. As a consequence there might 
                                                 
18 It is interesting to bring to the fore the fact that in Switzerland popular initiatives and referenda are a 
central part of the democratic life of the country, and they are very frequently used. Citizens can also call 
a referendum on issues like cantonal hospital planning.  
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be an incentive to expand the number of services given to patients as physicians’ density 
goes up.19 
The coefficient for the variable managed care is negative, as expected, but not 
significantly different from zero. The general hypothesis or expectation is that the 
greater the number of people choosing a managed care programme, the lower the 
ensuing health costs. The result obtained in this study could be due to the fact that 
managed care plans offered nowadays in Switzerland are a somewhat weaker version of 
managed care programmes normally provided in other countries (for instance, in the 
US). For example, the selected physicians of managed care plans are remunerated with 
a fee-for-service scheme, not much of an incentive for a family doctor to reduce his 
services, and hence costs. 
Time variable T is positive and significantly different from zero. Hence, there is a 
tendency in all cantons toward higher per-capita health expenditures. This phenomenon 
might be explained by the presence on the market of new and more expensive 
technologies, and by the fact that the package of health care benefits covered by the 
FHIA has ballooned in the 1990s.  
 
6. Conclusions  
Our study has presented the organization of the Swiss health care system and an 
empirical analysis of the determinants of the per-capita cantonal health care 
expenditures. In the first part of the paper, particular attention has been paid to the 
description of broad differences existing between the 26 cantons with respect to per-
capita health expenditures, the public financing activity and existing productive 
capacity. The descriptive analysis shows that in Switzerland, where the principle of 
federalism is very deep-rooted and deeply felt by the whole population, such 
decentralization of the health care sector has given rise to significant differences 
between cantons in terms of per-capita health expenditures, equity of financing, and 
structure of the supply. For these reasons we suggest that the central state should play a 
more dominant role in the Swiss health policy, toning down these current marked 
                                                 
19 For further details on the supplier-induced demand theory see McGuire (2000) and Domenighetti et al. 
(1997). Furthermore, it is worth pointing out  that the impact of physicians’ density on the per capita 
socialized health expenditures, associated with a fee-for-service scheme, confirms the results obtained by 
Gerdtham et al. (1998). 
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regional differences and finding the adequate instruments to control the growth of health 
care expenditures effectively. 
In the second part of the paper we have presented the results of the estimation of a 
double logarithmic linear econometric model of per-capita cantonal health care 
expenditures over the years 1996-2001 using panel data. The model serves to determine 
the responsiveness of per-capita expenditures to own income, unemployment and 
variables relating to demographic and structural characteristics of cantons. The 
estimated model demonstrates the importance of physicians’ density (possible supply 
induced demand phenomenon in a system where the fee-for-service scheme is present). 
We believe that by controlling physicians’ density we may curb any rise in per-capita 
health care expenditures. Another important factor that seems to explain the difference 
in the cantonal health care expenditures is the percentage of over 75 in the population, 
which cannot be influenced by health policies. It is our belief that, faced with an ageing 
population exhibiting regional differences, a more active financial intervention by the 
central state would be highly desirable in order to avoid fiscal distress at the cantonal 
level. 
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